The Service Industries and U.S. Economic Growth Since World War II by Victor R. Fuchs
NBER Working Paper Series
THE SERVICE INDUSTRIES AND U.S. ECONOMIC
GROWTH SINCE WORLD WAR II
Victor R. Fuchs*
Working Paper No.211
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
204 Junipero Serra Boulevard, Stanford, CA 94305
November 1977
Preliminary; not for quotation.
NBER working papers are distributed informally and in limited
number for comments only. They should not be quoted without
written permission of the author.
This report has not undergone the review accorded official
NBER publications; in particular, it has not yet been submitted
for approval by the Board of Directors.
*The author is Professor of Economics at StanfordUniversity,
and Vice President, National Bureau of Economic Research.
This paper was presented at theKeyIssues Lecture Series at
New York University on November 2, 1977. Helpfulcomments
from Jules Backman and the research assistance ofKrlsta Chinn
are gratefully acknowledged.ABSTRACT
During the past 15 years employment and current dollar gross
product continued to shift to the Service sector at about the same rate
as in the early post—World War II period, while the Service sector's share
of gross product in constant dollars remained relatively constant.
Productivity (as measured in the National Income Accounts) continued to
grow less rapidly than in Industry or Agriculture. The rate of growth
of output per worker for the total economy was almost one percent per
annum less than in 1948—65, but the shift to the Service sector contri-
buted less than .1 percent per annum to the decrease in productivity
growth. Real CDP grew almost as rapidly as in 1948—65, while employment
growth accelerated due to a sharp increase in the population of working
age. The expansion of service employment contributed substantially to
the growth of female employment throughout the post—World War II period,
but the increase in female labor force participation was not a signifi-
cant factor in either the acceleration of employment or the slowdown of
productivity growth in 1961—76. The growth of the Service sector also
contributed to the growth of government employment. Apart from changes
in industry mix, the expansion of government employment has been quite
modest. Population projections to the end of this century indicate the
likelihood of a marked decrease in the rate of growth of employment (and
output per capita) 1990—2000 because of slow growth of working age
population and the end of the transition to high female labor force
participation.THE SERVICEINDUSTRIES ANDU.S.ECONOMIC
GROWTH SINCE WORLD WARII
Victor R. Fuchs
"The most important concomitant of economic progress,"wrote Colin
Clark in 1940, is "the movement of labor from agricultureto manufacture,
and from manufacture to commerce and services."1Subsequent developments
have been fully consistent with Clark's observation, and thisclose rela-
tionship between economic growth and the expansion of Service employment
has been discussed by many economists.2
Until after World War II, the increase in the Service sector's
share of total U.S. employment was largely at the "expense" ofAgriculture;
employment in Industry was also expanding rapidly. Since then, Service
employment continued to expand rapidly with both Industry and Agriculture
experiencing large decreases in relative shares. In a series of studies
conducted in the 1960's I concluded that the primary reason for the shift
of employment from Industry to Service was the more rapid rate ofgrowth
of productivity in Industry.3
The sector difference in productivity advance has aroused fears
that the shift to services will slow down growth for theeconomy as a
whole. Does a "service economy" imply a "stagnant economy"? Thispaper
first examines recent trends (the past 15 years) inemployment, output,
and productivity to determine whether the sector differentials haveper-
sisted. These trends and their impact on the overall growth of the
economy are analyzed. The relationship between the Service sector and
the growth of female and government employment isconsidered, and projections2
of population, employment, and output through the end of this century are
presented. The paper concludes with a few speculative observations con-
cerning services and growth.
Definitions
The comparison of sector trends necessarily involves some arbitrary
definitions. My definition of the Service sector includes wholesale and
retail trade, finance, insurance and real estate, general government, and
professional, personal, business, and repair services. This sector is com-
pared with "Industry" (including mining, construction, manufacturing, trans-
portation, communications and public utilities, and government enterprise)
and Agriculture. Some comparisons will also be made with agriculture and
government eliminated (i.e., the private non—agricultural economy).
The time period analyzed is from 1961 to 1976. The choice of
initial and terminal years is important because the relative importance of
services tends to rise in slack periods and decline in boom years. It
is desirable to extend the analysis as close to the present as possible
(i.e., 1976) and 1961 is a year of comparable slackness,. although it was
the trough of a recession while 1976 was not. The overall unemployment
rates were 6.7 percent in 1961 and 7.7 percent in 1976. Probably more
relevant are the unemployment rates for males 20 years of age and over
which were 5.7 percent in 1961 and 5.9 percent in 1976.
As a check on the sensitivity to choice of years, the trends
between two prosperous years, 1956 and 1973, were also calculated. The
results were very similar. Employment growth between 1956 and 1973 was
somewhat slower than in 1961—76 for each sector, but the Industry—Service
trend differential varied by less than 0.1 percent per annum. In this3
paper the 1961—76 period is compared with earlier post—World War II trends,
measured from 1948 to 1965, two years with identical unemployment rates
for adult males.
It should be noted that significant revisions of the national
income accounts were undertaken in recent years.4 These revisions affected
sector levels and also had some effect on rates of change. For this reason
the changes from 1948 to 1965 were recalculated, although the results are
sufficiently close to those reported in The Service Economy to permit
reliance on the analyses presented there.
Employment
Table 1 shows that the differential trends in employment which
characterized the first two decades following World War II have continued
in recent years. The Industry—Service differential was slightly larger
in the earlier period (1.7 percentage points per annum vs. 1.4), but this
j, -Ae ctrrned(orce',
isentirely attributable to a relative decline4between 1961 and 1976.
The Industry—Service differential excluding the armed forces was 1.6 per-
centage points per annum In both periods. Agriculture continued to lose
ground relatively (and even absolutely), but because it has become such
a small part of the economy, the expansion of the Service sector has been
more at the expense of Industry than was true In earlier periods. Thus,
even the Industry—Service comparison omitting government shows a large
differential trend.
The decline in Industry's share is manifest In all the major
groups, including manufacturing, which grew at only one percent per
annum.The increase in the Service sector's share was led by the4 .
Table1. Levels and rates of change of employmenta by sector, selected
years 1948—76.
Part A: Sector shares (percent)
1948 1961 1965 1976
Total economy
Agriculture 10.8 6.9 5.5 4.2
Industry 43.2 38.6 39.1 35.1
Service 46.0 54.5 55.4 60.7
privateb non—agriculture
Industry 54.0 48.4 48.6 43.0
Service 46.0 51.6 51.4 57.0
Part B: Rates of change (percent per annum)C S
1948—65 1961—76








aFull_time equivalent persons engaged.
bExciudesgovernment.
cContinuously compounded.
Sources: The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States,
1947—1974, Statistical Tables (for 1948, 1961 and 1965) (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Business Economics); and Survey
of Current Business, July 1977 (for 1976).5
services proper with a growth of 3.1 percent per annum. Some authors
like to stress intra—sector variability (and it exists), but it is
instructive to note that the slowest growing part of the Service sector,
retail trade, grew more rapidly than construction, the fastest growing
major group in Industry.
Gross Domestic Product and Sector Productivity
The continued shift to the Service sector is also evident in
gross domestic product measured in current dollars (see Table 2). Indeed,
by this criterion the shift from Industry to Service accelerated slightly
in 1961—76. When we measure output in constant (1972) dollars (Table 3),
however, we observe very little shift from Industry to Service. Apart
from the decline of Agriculture there has been very little change in
sector shares of gross product in constant dollars for half a century!
The sector trends in productivity, presented in Table 4, are
derived in the following way. The actual rate of output per worker is
simply the rate for gross domestic product in constant (1972) dollars
minus the rate of growth of employment. The rates relative to the total
economy for output per unit of labor input (and output per unit of total
factor input) are derived by assuming that factor prices change at the
same rate in all sectors. If so, the sector change In total labor compen-
sation (or total compensation to all factors) relative to the change for
all sectors is approximately equal to the change in labor input (or total
factor input) in that sector relative to that for the economy as a whole.5
The Industry—Service differential in growth of output per worker
was lower in 1961—76 than In 1948—65, but the sector differences6
.
Table2. Levels and rates of change of gross domestic product in
current dollars by sector, selected years 1948—76.
Part A: Sector shares (percent)
1948 1961 1965 1976
Total economy
Agriculture 9.3 4.2 3.5 3.1
Industry 46.8 45.0 45.6 41.2
Service 43.9 50.8 50.9 55.7
Private non—agriculture
Industry 55.1 51.6 52.0 47.2
Service 44.9 48.4 48.0 52.8
.
PartB: Rates of change (percent per annum)
1948—65 1961—76







Sources and notes: See Table 1.
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Table 3. Levels and rates of change of gross domestic product in
constant (1972) dollars, by sector, selected years 1948—76.
Part A: Sector shares (percent)
1948 1961 1965 1976
Total economy
Agriculture 5.8 4.3 3.6 2.9
Industry 43.0 40.7 43.2 40.7
Service 51.3 55.0 53.2 56.3
Private non—agriculture
Industry 50.8 48.2 50.3 46.7
Service 49.2 51.8 49.7 53.3
Part B: Rates of change (percent per annum)
1948—65 1961—76







Sources and notes: See Table 1.8
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Service, excluding government 2.27 1.41
Rates relative to the total economy




Service, excluding government —.04 —.07




Service, excluding government —.32 —.05
Source: Tables 1, 2 and 3.
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in the two other productivity measures were somewhat larger in the more
recent period. For 1948—65 almost half of the sector differences in
growth of output per person was attributable to differential changes in
hours of work, quality of labor, and capital per worker.6 These differ-
ences were apparently much less important in recent years.
Overall Productivity
One of the most striking features of Table 4 is the general
retardation in the growth of output per worker in 1961—76 compared with
1948—65. It is this slowdown in overall productivity advance which
some observers seek to attribute to the growth of services. A few
simple calculations, however, show that sector shifts can explain only
a very small part of the slowdown.
When output shares remain constant over time an index of aggre-
gate output per worker is simply a weighted average of the indexes of
output per worker in each sector where the weights are terminal year
employment shares.7 If one applies the 1965 sector distribution of
employment to the 1961—76 sector trends in productivity, or if one
applies the 1976 sector distribution to the 1948—65 sector trends, the
alteration in the rate of growth of output per worker for the total economy
is only .1 percent per annum compared with the rates actually observed.
Even these calculations overstate the effect of the shift from Industry
to Service because part of the .1 percent per annum sector distribution
effect is attributable to the decline of Agriculture, not shifts within
the non—Agriculture sector.10
.
Thisshould not come as a surprise. Grossman and I simulated
productivity trends for 50 years into the future under a wide variety
of assumptions about sector shares of output and employment, and trends
in these shares. We found that the shift to services would have only a
small effect on national productivity growth.8 Noreover, Table 4 shows
clearly that the slowdown in productivity growth was present in each
sector. It was largest in Agriculture and smallest in Service, with a
decline in Industry slightly larger than the decline for the total economy.
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the deceleration
in productivity growth in all its aspects, but a few comments seem
warranted. First, it is important to note that real output grew almost
as rapidly in 1961—76 as in 1948—65 (see Table 3). Looked at purely in
statistical terms, the slowdown in productivity growth was accounted for
primarily by the acceleration in the growth of employment from 1.1 percent
to 1.8 percent per annum (see Table 1).
Second, it should be noted that output per capita, as distinct
from output per worker, grew more rapidly in 1961—76 than in
1948—65 (see Table 5). The acceleration in employment growth was not
due to a faster growth of population in general (population growth
actually slowed down), but to a sharp increase in the population of working
age. It is true that employment grew somewhat more rapidly than did the
working age population in 1961—76 (because of the rise in female labor
force participation), but this was also true in 1948—65.
.11
Table 5. Rates of change of output, population and employment, 1948—65




Output per capita 2.08 2.46
Population 20—64 years of ageb .86 1.45
Population under 20 and 65 or overb 2.63 .60
Employment (f_t_e)C 1.08 1.76







bEconomic Report of the President, January 1977 (Washington,





It might be thought that the rapid increase in female employment
was a significant reason for the acceleration of total employment in
recent years, but Table 5 shows that this was not true. Both male and
female employment accelerated. The fact that female employment grew more
rapidly than male in both periods and that females' share of employment
was larger in the second period contributed only .1 percent per annum to
the change in overall employment growth.
The extremely rapid growth of female employment revealed in
Table 5 explains a significant portion of total employment growth since
1948. Of the 30 million workers added to the U.S. labor force between
1948 and 1976, almost 20 million were women. The growth of female
employment does not, however, explain the acceleration of total employ—
ment in 1961—76 because the sex differential was present in both periods.
Female labor force participation has been studied by many econo-
mists in recent years,9 but a full explanation of the dramatic rise of
recent decades has not yet been provided. Much of the research emphasizes
the general rise in wage rates (for men and women) or shifts in the
supply curve of female labor. I believe this is part of the story, but
I believe another important and frequently neglected part Is the particu—
larly rapid growth in demand for female labor due to the expansion of
the Service sector. Of particular importance is the location of many
Service industries in residential areas and the greter flexibility in
hours of work.
With the aid of Census of Population data on employment by sex
and industry group, we can make a rough estimate of how much the expansion13
of the service industries contributed to the growth of female employment.
In Table 6 the growth rates for females and males and the differential
between them are decomposed into the portion attributable to changes in
industry mix and the portion attributable to increases in the female
share of employment within each industry. We see that the change in mix
(at the one—digit level) contributed almost one—half of the total sex
differential in employment growth.
Table 7 shows the relation between the expansion of services and
the growth of female employment in a particularly striking way. The
relative gain In female employment between 1950 and 1970 (the extent to
which female employment in 1970 was larger than what it would have been
if it had grown at the national rate) was 7.7 million jobs. Of this
number, 4.7 million were obtained in professional and related services,
2.3 million in other services industries, and only .7 million in the
rest of the economy. To be sure, the complex relationship between sector
and sex differentials in employment growth is not captured in such a simple
calculation. The growth in demand for services may be partly a result of an
increase in female labor force participation rather than a cause, but
Tables 6 and 7 do, it seems to me, reveal an important part of the total story.
Government Employment
Along with the growth of female employment, another startling
feature of the post—World War II U.S. economy has been the rapid growth
of government employment. By 1976 more than one in six employed persons
was on a government payroll; the ratio was less than 10 percent in 1948.
These data are frequently used to attack "bureaucratic proliferation."14
Table 6. Rates of growth of female and male employment, 1950 to 1970
(percent per annum).
.
Female Male Female minus male




Changein industry•a mix .69 —.33 1.02
(3)Change in female'sshareb .88 —.42 1.30
(4)Change in total economyC 1.69 1.69 0
aA constant female share and constant total.
bAssumes constant industry mix and constant total.
CAssumes constant female share and constant industry mix.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Censuses of Population, 1950 and
1970, summary volumes.
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(000) (000) (000) (% per
annum)
(000)
Total 54,27576,149 21,874 1.69 0
Male 39,36447,505 8,141 .94 —7,724
Female 14,91128,644 13,733 3.26 +7,724
Female——prof. &rel. svcs.2,707 8,527 5,820 5.74 +4,729
Female——other svc. sector7,50112,779 5,278 2.66 +2,255
Female, exc. svc. sector 4,703 7,338 2,635 2.22 +740
Male——prof. &rel. svcs. 1,952 4,950 2,998 4.65 +2,210
Male——other svc. sector12,74516,980 4,235 1.43 —902
Male, exc. svc. sector 24,66625,575 909 .18 —9,032
aDifference between actual change (column 3) and change if sector hadgrown
at the national rate for all sectors.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Censuses of Population, 1950 and
1970, suiary volumes.16
.
Theimplication is that government agencies have been multiplying and
expanding in accordance with Parkinson's Law. An alternative interpreta-
tion is that there has been very little expansion of government employment
in the sense of government taking over the production of goods and services
that were formerly produced in the private sector. Instead, what has
happened is that certain industries in the Service sector (e.g., health,
education) have grown particularly rapidly in recent decades and these
industries happen to be ones in which government traditionally has played
a significant role. According to this view the shift from private to
government employment should be seen largely as a consequence of the
growth of a service economy.
The data give considerable support to the second interpretation.
Table 8 presents the results of a shift and share analysis of employment
growth rates between 1950 and 1970 similar to that presented in Table 6.
Using Census data on employment cross—classified by industry and class
of worker I decompose the growth of government and private employment into
the portion attributable to differential industry growth (change in
industry mix), the portion attributable to shifts between the private
and government sectors within each industry (government share), and the
portion attributable to the growth of the total economy. This calcula-
tion is done (A) with all industries and (B) excluding postal service
and public administration, which always have 100 percent in government.
The results are qualitatively similar in both cases. The first row of
Table 8 shows a substantial differential in the growth of government and
private employment over the two decades amounting to 2.7 or 3.6 percent
per annum, depending upon whether postal service and public administration17
Table 8. Rates of growth of government and private employment, 1950 to








(1)Actual 4.04 4.98 1.34 1.34 2.70 3.64
Attributable to:
(2)Change in a
industry mix 1.81 2.45 —.08 —.08 1.89 2.53
(3)Change In govern-
ment's shareb .54 .89 —.27 —.22 .81 1.11
(4)Change in total
economyC 1.69 1.64 1.69 1.64 0 0
(A) Includes all industries.
(B) includes all industries except postal service and public administration.
aAssumes constant government share and constant total.
bAssumes constant industry mix and constant total.
cAssumes constant government share and constant Industry mix.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Censuses of Population, 1950 and 1970,
summary volumes.18
.
areincluded or excluded. The next two rows show that most of this
differential is attributable to the differential rate of growth of
industries (i.e., the change in industry mix) and less than a third is
due to an increasing government share holding industry mix constant.
Table 9 examines the same phenomena from a somewhat different
point of view. Between 1950 and 1970 total employment in the economy
increased by almost 22 million, or a rate of change of 1.69 percent per
annum. Private employment grew at 1.34 percent per annum, which meant
that the private sector was short 4.6 million jobs compared to what it
would have had if it had grown at the rate for the total economy. The
government sector showed an equivalent relative gain in employment. The
next several rows of Table 9, however, put this shift in a different
perspective. The private sector, excluding professional and related
services, suffered a relative loss of 8.2 million jobs between 1950 and
1970. Where did they go? The largest relative gains were in private
professional and related services, 3.6 million. The next largest was in
government professional and related services, 3.3 million. By comparison,
the gains in public administration and other government were relatively
small. Thus, the so—called expansion of government employment might more
accurately be characterized as an expansion of professional and related
services, both private and governmental.
These calculations do not, of course, capture all aspects of the
expanded role government plays in the economy. There has been a large
increase in government serving as a financial intermediary for retirement
benefits, medical insurance, and the like. There has also been a huge
increase in regulatory intervention, especially with respect to activities19













Total 54,27576,149 21,874 1.69 0
Private 48,78663,829 15,043 1.34 —4,619
Government 5,48912,321 6,832 4.04 +4,619
Private, exc. professional
and related services 46,14856,505 10,357 1.01 —8,242
Private professional
and related services 2,638 7,324 4,686 5.11 +3,623
Government professional
and related services 2,021 6,152 4,131 5.57 +3,316
Postal service 454 719 265 2.30 +82
Public admlnistrationb 2,035 3,483 1,448 2.69 +628
Other governmentc 979 1,967 988 3.49 +593
aDifference between actual change (column 3) and change if sector hadgrown
at the national rate for all sectors.
bFederal state and local.
cMostly construction, transportation, communications and public utilities.20
.
andproducts that might affect health. But the data do not support
frequently voiced simplistic charges about a "government takeover" of
economic production.
Summary of Findings
The principal findings to this point are:
1) During the past 15 years employment and current dollar gross
product continued to shift to the Service sector at about the same rate
as in the early post—World War II period.
2) The Service sector's share of gross product in constant
dollars remained relatively constant; productivity (as measured in the
National Income Accounts) continued to grow less rapidly than in
Industry or Agriculture.
3) The rate of growth of output per worker for the total
economy was almost one percent per annum less than in 1948—65.This
reflected a slight decrease in the rate of growth of output and a sharp
acceleration in the rate of growth of employment.
4) The shift to the Service sector contributed less than .1 per-
cent per annum to the decrease in productivity growth.
5) The acceleration in employment growth is explained almost
entirely by a sharp increase in the population of working age. Total
population growth was much less than in 1948—65, and output per capita
actually rose more rapidly in 1961—76.
6) Female labor force participation rates have risen at a very
rapid rate throughout the post—World War II period, in part becauseof
the expansion of the Service sector. On the other hand, female employment21
was not a significant factor in either the acceleration of employment
or the slowdown of productivity growth in 1961—76.
7) Government employment has grown at a very rapid rate in
recent decades. The principal reason is the expansion of service Industries,
such as health and education, in which government has traditionally
played a large role. Apart from changes in industry mix, the expansion
of government employment has been quite modest.
One huge caveat must be attached to the finding concerning sector
differentials in productivity. As is well known, the methods used to mea-
sure "real output" in services frequently fall far short of a desirable
standard. For instance, until the recent revisions,4 output in government
was simply equated with full—time—equivalent employment. Output per
worker never changed, by definition. The revised method is based on
employee hours in the various civil service and wage board grades weighted
by the 1972 payrolls in these grades. That Is, changes in the "quality"
of labor measured by changes in the mix of grades are assumed to produce
proportional changes in output. Changes In capital stocks or technology
continue to be ignored.
Another problem area Is banking. Prior to the revisions, output
in banking (and other financial intermediaries except life insurance
carriers) was indexed by constant dollar deposits. This produced an
apparent sharp decline in banking productivity over time as the volume
of services provided per constant dollar deposits rose.'° This approach
was discarded in the last revision. Now real output In banking Is assumed
to be proportional to full—time—equivalent employment!22
.
Therates of growth of output and productivity in government,
banking, and many other service industries are almost surely understated
in the National Income Accounts. I do not, however, believe that these
biases are the principal reason for the observed Industry—Service differ-
ential because there are also biases that work in the opposite direction.
For instance, the growth of output and productivity in retailing is
probably overstated because of a failure to capture a decline in services
provided by retailers per constant dollar of goodssold.11 Furthermore,
there probably are large downward biases in many indexes of Industry
output, especially when the goods produced are complex and undergoing
rapid technological change (e.g., computers).
I also do not believe that these biases can explain the slowing
down of productivity growth in recent years. This slowing down seems to
be a real phenomenon, the explanation for which should rather be sought
in the slowing down of growth of capital per worker and in a variety
of other social and economic changes.'2
Predictions to 1990 and 2000
We have seen how demographic trends can have significant effects
on employment, productivity, and output per capita. It maybeuseful,
therefore, to look ahead to 1990 and 2000 and try to project growth
rates for the variables under discussion. To be sure, such an exercise
should be treated with great caution. The literature is replete with
examples of demographic predictions and projections which proved to be
far off target. For instance, Peter Drucker, usually an acute observer
of economic and social trends, in a 1955 article in Harper's predicted23
an increase in population of at least 40 percent by 1975. The actual
increase was only 29 percent. He no doubt failed to anticipate the
tremendous decrease in the birth rate during that period. In the same
article he predicted an increase in the labor force of 20 percent. The
actual increase was 41 percent! The discrepancy was probably attributable
primarily to a failure to anticipate the sharp rise in female labor force
participation. The projections presented in Table 10 should, therefore,
be viewed for the most part as one possible scenario rather than as firm
forecasts.
Probably the most reliable projection is for the population age
20 to 64 in 1990. This figure cannot be affected by subsequent changes
in the birth rate, and death rates for that age group are already
sufficiently low that even further reductions, far greater than those
expected, would not alter the growth rate very much. Therefore, short
of a major catastrophe (not allowed for in any of the projections), we
see that the population of working age will continue to grow at a very
rapid rate until 1990. After that point, however, (actually beginning
in the late 1980's) there will be a noticeable retardation in the growth
of population of working age.
The projections for the population under 20 and 65 and over
over are much more speculative because sharp changes in the birth rate
or in death rates at older ages could significantly alter trends. Using
the Bureau of the Census medium projections for cohort fertility rates
(approximately 2.1 births per woman) and assuming a slight improvement
in life expectancy, the non—working age population will grow at only
.5 percent per annumuntil1990, and at a slightly more rapid rate from24
Table 10. Projected rates of change of output, population and employment,
1976—1990 and 1990—2000 (percent per annum).
Note:
Population projections are taken from the Bureau of the Census
medium estimates of cohort fertility. Employment projections are
based on the author's assumption that female labor force partici-
pation rates will continue to rise rapidly until 1990, move slowly
thereafter, and that unemployment rates in 1990 and 2000 will be
at the 1976 level. Sector growth rates of output per worker are
assumed the same as in 1961—76,and sector differentials in employ-
ment growth are also expected to continue as before.
Source:
1976—1990 1990—2000 Actual (1961—1976)
Population, 20—64 1.3 .8 1.45
Population, <20 + 65+ .5 .6 .60
Total population .9 .7 1.05
Employment (full & parttime)
Male 1.0 .6 1.22
Female 2.5 1.2 3.09
Total 1.7 .9 1.90
Employment (f—t—e) 1.5 .7 1.76
Gross Domestic Product
(1976 dollars) 3.2 2.3 3.51
Output per worker 1.7 1.6 1.75
Output per capita 2.3 1.6 2.46
.
.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P—25.25
1990 to 2000.13 These rates are consistent with the low rate recorded
In the 1961—76 period.
Given the rapid growth of population 20—64 until 1990, I expect
employment to grow almost as rapidly during that period as in 1961—76
(assuming unemployment is approximately the same in 1990 as in 1976).
This projection is higher than that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
because I expect female labor force participation to increase at a more
rapid rate than does the BLS.14 For women ages 20—64 the BLS is project-
ing a labor force participation rate of 61 percent in 1990 compared with
a current rate of about 55 percent. My projections assume a rate of
68 percent. (Note: The comparable male rate is now, and is expected to
be, about 89 percent.) It is possible that I may be correct about female
employment but still be too high for total full—time—equivalent employ-
ment because male labor force participation rates may fall more rapidly
than in the past, or part—time employment may increase sharply. On the
other hand, my employment projection may be too low if there is a
reversal of past trends toward earlier retirement.
If I am correct that female labor force participation rates will
be quite high by 1990, then employment growth for 1990 to 2000 is likely
to decelerate markedly. Not only will the population 20—64 grow slowly
during that period, but the potential contribution to employment of
further Increases in female labor force participation rates will be much
weaker.
The final projections concerning output and productivity are the
most speculative of all and are presented primarily to provide a basis26
.
fordiscussion.I assume that the Industry and Service shares of real
output will remain relatively unchanged (as they have in the past. I
further assume that output per worker in each sector will grow at the
same rate as in 1961—76, which in the cases of Industry and Service, are
approximately the same rates as for the half century since 1929.
Under these assumptions the growth rate of total output 1976—1990
would be only .3 percentage points per annum less than in 1961—76 and
the increase in output per capita would be almost equal to that of the
past 15 years. The decade from 1990 to 2000, however, would show a
marked slowdown in the growth of output and output per capita because
of the slow growth in employment. To the extent that sector increases
in productivity are faster or slower than those recorded in 1961—76,
the output and productivity projections would have to be modified
accordingly.
Concluding Comments
The sector rates of productivity growth 1961—76 are low in
comparison with the exceptional rates recorded in 1948—65, but they are
squarely in line with longer—term trends from 1929 to 1965. Thus the
question currently receiving so much attention——"Why has the rate of
productivity advance slowed?'t——might more reasonably be formulated
"Why did productivity grow so rapidly after World War II?"
This paper rejects the hypothesis that the shift of employment
to the Service sector was a major cause of changes in the rate of growth
of productivity. The paper calls attention to the importance of demo-
graphic trends for economic growth, both in the past and in the decades S27
ahead. Substantial decreases in the rates of growth of employment and
output per capita during 1990—2000 seem inescapable because of population
trends and because the transition of women to high rates of labor force
participation will be almost over.
Although output growth will slow, there is no basis for assuming
a "stagnant" economy. Productivity does advance in Services, albeit at
a slower pace. Greater emphasis is likely to be given to the "qualita-
tive" dimensions of life. Real GNP (as currently measured) will be
increasingly unsatisfactory as an Index of long—term trends in the
well—being of society, and we are likely to see more effort devoted to
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